Ontario Securities Commission

Ontario Securities Commission Rule 72-503 Distributions Outside Canada and Consequential Amendments

On March 31, 2018, Ontario Securities Commission Rule 72-503 Distributions Outside Canada and consequential amendments (Rule 72-503 and Consequential Amendments) became effective under the Securities Act.

The purpose of Rule 72-503 and Consequential Amendments is to bring greater clarity and certainty for market participants when offering securities to investors outside Canada.

The full text of Rule 72-503 and Consequential Amendments is available in the Ontario Securities Commission’s Bulletin at 2018 41 OSCB 2363 and on the Commission’s website at www.osc.gov.on.ca.

(151-G156)

Ontario Energy Board

Amendments to the Tranmission System Code

March 15, 2018

Section 3B of the Transmission System Code is amended by adding new sections as follows:

3B Reliability and Integrity of Transmission System

3B.2 Cyber Security

3B.2.1 Definitions

“Cyber Security”
means a body of technologies, processes, and practices designed to protect networks, computers, programs, data and personal information from attack, damage or unauthorized access. Cyber security includes electronic security and physical security issues as they relate to cyber security protection.
“Cyber Security Framework”
means the Ontario Cyber Security Framework that was issued December 20, 2017, or the current version of the document

3B.2.2 Reporting

3B.2.2.1

A transmitter shall report to the Board on the status of cyber security readiness referencing the Cyber Security Framework at such times and in such a manner as may be directed by the Board.

3B.2.2.2

The Chief Executive Officer of the transmitter shall certify the transmitter’s reported cyber security readiness in such form as may be required by the Board.

3B.2.3 Continuing Obligations Regarding Transmission System and Privacy

Nothing in this section 3B.2 shall limit any obligations of a transmitter to maintain the reliability and integrity of its transmission system, and to protect personal information.

(151-G157)

Amendments to the Distribution System Code

March 15, 2018

Section 1.2 of the Distribution System Code is amended by adding new definitions as follows:

1.2 Definitions

“Cyber Security”
means a body of technologies, processes, and practices designed to protect networks, computers, programs, data and personal information from attack, damage or unauthorized access. Cyber security includes electronic security and physical security issues as they relate to cyber security protection.
“Cyber Security Framework”
means the Framework Ontario Cyber Security Framework that was issued December 20, 2017, or the current version of the document.

Section 6 of the Distribution System Code is amended by adding new section 6.8 as follows:

6.8. Cyber Security

6.8.1 Reporting

6.8.1.1

A distributor shall report to the Board on the status of cyber security readiness referencing the Cyber Security Framework at such times and in such a manner as may be directed by the Board.

6.8.1.2

The Chief Executive Officer of the distributor shall certify the distributor’s reported cyber security readiness in such a form as may be required by the Board.

6.8.2 Continuing Obligations Re-Distribution System and Privacy

Nothing in this section shall limit any obligations of a distributor to maintain the reliability and integrity of its distribution system, and to protect personal information.

(151-G158)

Amendments to the Natural Gas Reporting and Record Keeping Requirements—Rule for Gas Utilities

March 15, 2018

Note: The text of the amendments is set out in italics below, for ease of identification only.

1. Section 1.8 is amended to add in the following in at the end of the section:

Sections 2.1.20 and 2.1.21 of this Rule, made by the Board on March 15, 2018, come into force on March 15, 2018 and are applicable to all filings due on or after that date.

2. Section 2.1 is amended to add in the following sections:

2.1.20 A utility shall provide in the form and manner required by the Board, annually, by the last day of the fourth month after the financial year end, the following information:

  1. whether or not the utility has publicly traded securities; and
  2. a list of affiliates of the utility that have publicly traded securities (affiliate has the same meaning as in the Ontario Business Corporations Act).

2.1.21 A utility shall provide in the form and manner required by the Board any changes to its status with respect to having publicly traded securities or any changes to its list of affiliates that have publicly traded securities within 10 days of the change occurring.

(151-G159)

Proposed Amendments to the Transmission System Code

April 30, 2018

2. definitions

First version Current version
2.0.46
“NERC”
means the North American Electric Reliability Council;
 2.0.46
“NERC”
means the North American Electric Reliability Corporation;
  2.0.47A
“OPA”
means the Independent Electricity System Operator or successor company;
2.0.55
“reliability organization”
means NERC, NERC’s reliability councils, and the IESO;
 2.0.55
“reliability organization”
means NERC, the Northeast Power Coordinating Council, and the IESO;

6. customer connections

6.1 General Requirements

First version Current version
6.1.5 A transmitter shall file its connection procedures for the Board’s approval within one year of the Code revision date. A transmitter shall also file any material amendments to those procedures for the Board’s approval. The transmitter may not give effect to such connection procedures or any material amendments thereto until the connection procedures or amendments have been approved by the Board or amended by the Board under section 6.1.6. 6.1.5 Intentionally left blank.
6.1.6 The Board may, on application or on its own motion, amend a transmitter’s connection procedures and any amendments thereto that have been previously approved by the Board. 6.1.6 The Board may, on application or on its own motion, amend a transmitter’s connection procedures and any amendments thereto that have been previously approved or amended by the Board.
6.1.7 Where, prior to the Code revision date, a transmitter had filed its connection procedures with the Board and such connection procedures do not contain all of the material required by section 6.1.4, the transmitter shall file the missing material within one year of the Code revision date. The Board may make a decision regarding the incomplete connection procedures pending the filing of the missing material. 6.1.7 Intentionally left blank.
6.8.3 Where a transmitter had an executed agreement with a neighbouring Ontario transmitter on, the parties shall amend that agreement as may be required to ensure that it complies with the requirements of sections 6.8.1 and 6.8.2. Such amendment shall be made as soon as any other amendment to the agreement is being made by the parties and in any event no later than the date that is five years from the Code revision date . 6.8.3 Where a transmitter had an executed agreement with a neighbouring Ontario transmitter on August 26, 2013, the parties shall amend that agreement as may be required to ensure that it complies with the requirements of sections 6.8.1 and 6.8.2. Such amendment shall be made as soon as any other amendment to the agreement is being made by the parties and in any event no later than August 26, 2018.

8 general technical requirements

First version Current version
8.1 Guidelines of Reliability Organizations 8.1 Intentionally Left Blank
8,1,1 A transmitter shall ensure compliance with the standards of all applicable reliability organizations.  
8.1.2 A transmitter shall provide to a customer, upon request, the name and address of a contact person for each applicable reliability organization.  

8.2 Protection and Control

First version Current version
8.2.1j) the two protection systems shall be supplied either from separate secondary windings On one voltage transformer or potential device and from separate current transformer secondary windings (using two current transformers – one current transformer for each protection system); and 8.2.1j) the two protection systems shall be supplied either from separate secondary windings of a voltage and current transformer or from separate voltage and current transformers.; and

8.3 Insulation Coordination

First version Current version
8.3.2 A tap connected to a shielded transmission circuit shall also be shielded. 8.3.2 The transmitter shall ensure that a tap connected to a shielded transmission circuit is also be shielded.

9. technical requirements for tapped trans-former stations supplying load

9.1 Supply Considerations

First version Current version
9.1.2 The neutrals of the power transformer primary windings at transmission system tapped stations are normally not grounded. 9.1.2 The transmitter shall ensure that the grounding of power transformer windings at tapped transmission system stations do not adversely affect the reliability of the transmission system.

9.2 Protection Requirements

First version Current version
9.2.1 The typical technical requirements for a transmitter’s tapped transformer stations protection are set out in Exhibit E.1, Schedule E of the applicable version of the connection agreement set out in Appendix 1, and Exhibits F.1 and F.2, Schedule F of version A of the connection agreement set out in Appendix 1. 9.2.1 The transmitter’s protection and teleprotection requirements will be identified in the connection agreement. These requirements apply to the facilities that interface between the customer and the transmitter systems. Typical technical requirements for a transmitter’s tapped transformer stations protection are set out in Exhibit E.1, Schedule E of the applicable version of the connection agreement set out in Appendix 1, and Exhibits F.1 and F.2, Schedule F of version A of the connection agreement set out in Appendix 1.
9.2.2 Line protections are required when transformers connected to separate supply circuits are operated in parallel on the low voltage side, or if a large synchronous infeed exists at the low voltage bus. 9.2.2 Intentionally left blank.
9.2.3 Directional current sensing relays may be required to detect infeed into faults within the transmission system and to isolate a tapped transformer station’s contribution to the fault. Distance or impedance (21) relays as specified in Exhibit F.2, Schedule F of version A of the connection agreement set out in Appendix 1, may serve this need. 9.2.3 Intentionally left blank.
9.2.4 If the tapped transformer is connected ungrounded wye or delta on the primary, then ground under voltage (64 27) and ground over voltage (64 59) protections as shown in Exhibit F.2, Schedule F of version A of the connection agreement set out in Appendix 1 are required to detect ground faults. 9.2.4 Intentionally left blank.
9.2.5 Where the tapped transformer is connected wye grounded on the primary (Yg/D or Yg/Yg), a ground over current relay (64) as indicated in Exhibit F.2, Schedule F of version A of the connection agreement set out in Appendix 1, connected in the transformer neutral, may be used for detection. 9.2.5 Intentionally left blank.

10 protection system requirements

10.1 Telecommunications

First version Current version
10.1.2 A transmitter shall specify to all customers telecommunication channel media and protective systems. 10.1.2 A transmitter shall specify to all customers telecommunication channel media and protective systems in the connection agreement. These requirements shall apply to the facilities that interface between the customer and the transmitter systems.
10.1.4 Where each of the dual protections protecting the same system element requires communication channels, a shall ensure that the equipment and channel for each protections system is separated physically and designed to minimize the risk that both protections might be disabled simultaneously by a single contingency. 10.1.4 Intentionally left blank.
10.1.6 Major disturbances caused by telecommunication failures shall have annual frequency of less than 0.002 per year from the dependability aspect and less than 0.002 per year from the security aspect. 10.1.6 The transmitter shall include a maximum annual specification on major disturbances caused by telecommunication failures in the connection agreement.
10.1.7 A transmitter shall ensure that telecommunication protection for a single transmission system circuit shall be unavailable for no more than 42 minutes per year, and for two circuits, no more than four minutes per year. 10.1.7 The transmitter shall include a maximum annual specification for unavailability of the telecommunication protection for a single transmission system circuit and for two circuits in the connection agreement.
10.1.8 A transmitter shall ensure that the telecommunication false trip rate used as part of a protection system for a single transmission system circuit is no more than 0.1 false trips per year, and for two circuits, no more than 0.001 false trips per year. 10.1.8 The transmitter shall include a maximum annual specification for telecommunication false trip rate in the connection agreement.
10.1.9 A transmitter shall ensure that total transmission system circuit trips coincident with telecommunications failure are no more than 0.001 per year. 10.1.9 The transmitter shall include a maximum annual specification in the connection agreement for total transmission system circuit trips coincident with telecommunications failure.

10.2 Test Schedule For Relaying Communication Channels

First version Current version
10.2.2 Signal adequacy testing for unmonitored channels shall be done at one month intervals. Signal adequacy testing for monitored channels shall be done at twelve month intervals.  
10.2.3 Channel performance testing on leased communication circuits shall be conducted at 24 month intervals, while intervals for testing power line carrier equipment shall be equipment specific.  

10.3 Verification And Maintenance Practices

First version Current version
10.3.1 A transmitter shall use the maximum verification intervals established by reliability organizations and in accordance with applicable reliability standards: (a) four years for most 115kV elements, most transformer stations, and certain 230kV elements: (b) two years for all other high voltage elements. All newly commissioned protection systems shall be verified within six months of the initial in service date of the system. 10.3.1 The transmitter shall establish verification intervals for protection systems not otherwise covered by the requirements of a reliability organization. Verification is required after any change is made to an existing protection system.
10.3.2 Routine verification shall ensure with reasonable certainty that the protection systems respond correctly to fault conditions.  
10.3.3 A transmitter shall use an electrically initiated simulated fault clearing check to verify new protection systems, after any wiring or component changes are made to an existing protection system, and for the routine verification of a protection system.  

10.4 Functional Tests And Periodic Verification

First version Current version
10.4.1 For direct current circuitry checks, a transmitter shall thoroughly check the logic of the auxiliary circuitry with the direct current applied and the initiating devices suitably energized to initiate the process. When primary relays are the initiating device, the initiation shall be achieved by secondary injection of appropriate electrical quantities to the measuring elements. In cases where the sequence of operation is critical, monitoring by a portable sequence of events recorder may be required for proper analysis. Operation or tripping of any interrupting or isolating device shall always be verified, as well as annunciation and target operation. 10.4.1 For direct current circuitry checks, a transmitter shall thoroughly check the logic of the transmitter’s auxiliary circuitry with the direct current applied and the initiating devices suitably energized to initiate the process. Operation or tripping of any interrupting or isolating device shall always be verified, as well as local and/or remote annunciation.

10.5 Failure Protection For High Voltage Interrupting Devices

First version Current version
10.5.4 A transmitter shall not use automatic ground switches for any transmitter owned new installations for triggering line protection operation following the failure of a HVID. 10.5.4 A transmitter shall not use automatic ground switches for any transmitter owned new installations for triggering line protection operation.

10.6 Instrument Transformers

First version Current version
10.6.2 A transmitter shall ensure that current transformers are connected so that adjacent relay protection zones overlap. 10.6.2 A transmitter shall ensure that current transformers are connected so that adjacent relay protection zones overlap and, where they do not overlap, shall ensure appropriate mitigation is provided.

10.7 Battery Banks And Direct Current Supply

First version Current version
10.7.1 customer shall ensure that if either the battery charger fails or the AC supply source fails, the station battery bank shall have enough capacity to allow the station to operate for at least eight hours for a single battery system or at least six hours for each of the batteries in a two battery system. 10.7.1 The transmitter shall ensure that if either the battery charger fails or the AC supply source fails, the station battery bank shall have enough capacity to allow the station to operate for at least eight hours for a single battery system or at least six hours for each of the batteries in a two battery system.
10.7.2 Critical DC supplies shall be monitored and annunciated such as relay protection circuits and high voltage interrupters (HVIs). 10.7.2 The transmitter shall ensure that critical DC supplies such as relay protection circuits and high voltage interrupters (HVIs) shall be monitored and alarmed.
10.7.3 For all generating facilities connected to the transmission system, two separately protected (fuse/breaker) and monitored DC station battery systems are required. 10.7.3 The transmitter shall ensure that all generating facilities connected to the transmission system, have two separately protected (fuse/breaker) and monitored DC station battery systems unless the transmitter and IESO determine otherwise.
10.7.4 For tap transformer stations, have at least one protected (fuse/breaker) monitored DC station battery system is required unless two systems are specified by the Transmitter. 10.7.4 The transmitter shall ensure that tapped transformer stations, have at least one protected (fuse/breaker) monitored DC station battery system. The transmitter may specify that two systems are required.

13 coming into force

13.0.1 This Code shall be in effect as of the date on which it is published in the Ontario Gazette, and as of that date replaces the Transmission System Code issued by the Board on August 26, 2013.

Appendix 1

Version A–Form of Connection Agreement for Load Customers schedule E

General Technical Requirements

First version Current version
1.1 Intentionally Left Blank Guidelines of Reliability Organizations 1.1
1.1.1. Customers and Transmitters shall follow all reliability organizations= standards as they may be amended from time to time.  
1.1.2. The Transmitter shall provide to Customers upon request, the address and contact persons at the relevant reliability organization.  

1.3. Protection and Control

1.3.1. The protection systems, which protects transmission system elements, shall be capable of minimizing the severity and extent of disturbances to the transmission system while themselves experiencing a first-order single contingency such as the failure of a relay protection system to operate or the failure of a breaker to trip. In particular:

First version Current version
1.3.1.1. the elements designated by the Transmitter as essential to system reliability and security shall be protected by two protection systems. Each system shall be independently capable of detecting and isolating all faults on those elements. These elements shall have breaker failure protection, but breaker failure protection need not be duplicated. Both protection systems shall initiate breaker failure protection; 1.3.1.1. the elements designated by the Transmitter or the IESO as essential to system reliability and security shall be protected by two protection systems. Each system shall be independently capable of detecting and isolating all faults on those elements. These elements shall have breaker failure protection, but breaker failure protection need not be duplicated. Both protection systems shall initiate breaker failure protection;
1.3.1.3. the use of two identical protection systems is not generally, recommended, because it increases the risk of simultaneous failure of both systems due to design deficiencies or equipment problems; 1.3.1.3. the use of two identical protection systems should be avoided, because it increases the risk of simultaneous failure of both systems due to design deficiencies or equipment problems;
1.3.1.10. the two protection systems shall be supplied from separate secondary windings; on one voltage transformer or potential device and from separate current transformer secondary windings, i.e., from two separate current transformers; 1.3.1.10. the two protection systems shall be supplied either from separate secondary windings of a voltage and current transformer or from separate voltage and current transformers;

1.8. Procedures for Maintenance and Periodic Verification

First version Current version
1.8.1. The Transmitter, using good utility practice, may specify the maintenance criteria and the maximum time intervals between verification cycles for those parts of Customers’= facilities that may materially adversely affect the transmission system. The obligations for maintenance and performance re-verification shall be stipulated in the appropriate schedule to this Agreement. 1.8.1. The Transmitter, using good utility practice, may specify the maintenance criteria and the maximum time intervals between verification cycles for those parts of Customers’= facilities that may materially adversely affect the transmission system. The obligations for maintenance and performance re-verification shall be stipulated in the appropriate schedule to this Connection Agreement.

Schedule F

First version Current version

Additional Technical Requirements for Tapped Connections Transformer Stations Supplying Load:

Additional Technical Requirements for Tapped Connections:
  1. Transmitter’=s Tapped Transformer Stations; and
  2. Distributor’=s and Consumer=s Tapped Transformer Stations
  1. Transmitter’=s Tapped Transformer Stations; and
  2. Customer’=s Tapped Transformer Stations

1.1. Supply Considerations

First version Current version
1.1.4. The neutrals of the power transformer primary windings at transmission system tapped stations are normally not grounded. Transmitters shall approve grounded transformers by exception only. 1.1.4. Transmitter approval is required before grounding the neutral of power transformer windings at tapped transmission system stations.
1.1.5. Consumers and Distributors shall participate in load shedding to meet reliability standards. 1.1.5. Customers shall participate in load shedding to meet reliability standards.
1.1.6. A transmission system breaker of a Consumer or Distributor shall not autoreclose without Transmitter’=s approval. 1.1.6. A transmission system breaker of a Customer shall not autoreclose without Transmitter’=s approval.
1.1.7. A Consumer or a Distributor shall not manually energize a Transmitter’=s line without the Transmitter’=s approval. 1.1.7. A Customer shall not manually energize a Transmitter’=s line without the Transmitter’=s approval.
   

1.2. Protection Requirements

First version Current version
1.2.1. The typical technical requirements for Distributor and Consumer protection shall be followed, as presented in Exhibit E.1 of Schedule E and Exhibits F.1 and F.2 of this Schedule F. 1.2.1. The typical technical requirements for Customer protection shall be followed, as presented in Exhibit E.1 of Schedule E and Exhibits F.1 and F.2 of this Schedule F.

Schedule G

Protection System Requirements

1.1 Telecommunications

First version Current version
1.1.2 Transmitter shall specify telecommunication channel media and protective systems. 1.1.2 The Transmitter shall specify to the Customer the telecommunication channel media and protective systems. These requirements apply to the facilities that interface between the Customer and the Transmitter.
1.1.4. Where each of the dual protections protecting the same system element requires communication channels, the equipment and channel for each protection shall be separated physically and designed to minimize the risk that both protections might be disabled simultaneously by a single contingency. 1.1.4. Intentionally left blank.
1.1.6. Major disturbances caused by telecommunication failures shall have annual frequency of less than 0.002 per year from the dependability aspect and less than 0.002 per year from the security aspect. 1.1.6. Major disturbances caused by telecommunication failures shall have annual frequency of less than 0.002 per year from the dependability aspect and less than 0.002 per year from the security aspect or as otherwise prescribed by the Transmitter.
1.1.7. Telecommunication protection for a single transmission system circuit shall have an unavailability less than forty two (42) minutes per year, and for two circuits it shall be less than four (4) minutes per year. 1.1.7. Telecommunication protection for a single transmission system circuit shall have an unavailability less than forty two (42) minutes per year, and for two circuits it shall be no more than four (4) minutes per year or as otherwise prescribed by the Transmitter.
1.1.8. The telecommunication false-trip rate used as part of a protection system for a single transmission system circuit shall be not more than 0.1 false trips per year, and for two circuits it shall be not more than 0.001 false trips per year. 1.1.8. The telecommunication false-trip rate used as part of a protection system for a single transmission system circuit shall be not more than 0.1 false trips per year, and for two circuits it shall be not more than 0.001 false trips per year unless otherwise prescribed by the Transmitter.

1.1.9. Total transmission system circuit trips coincident with telecommunications failure shall be not more than 0.001 per year unless otherwise prescribed by the Transmitter.

1.2. Test Schedule for Relaying Communication Channels

First version Current version
1.2.1. Communication channels associated with protective relaying shall be tested at periodic intervals to verify that the channels are operational and that their characteristics lie are within specific tolerances. The testing consists of signal adequacy tests and channel performance tests. 1.2.1. Communication channels associated with protective relaying shall be tested at periodic intervals in accordance with applicable reliability standards to verify that the channels are operational and that their characteristics are within specific tolerances. Testing should include signal adequacy tests and channel performance tests. The Transmitter shall establish testing intervals for any communication channels not otherwise subject to reliability standards.
1.2.1.1. Signal adequacy test intervals are:  
1.2.1.1.1. Channels–for Protection (unmonitored) at one (1)-month intervals; and  
1.2.1.1.2. Channels–for Protection (monitored) at twelve (12)-month intervals.  
1.2.1.2. Channel performance testing on leased communication circuits shall be conducted at 24-month intervals, while intervals for testing power line carrier equipment shall be equipment-specific.  

1.3. Verification and Maintenance Practices

First version Current version
1.3.1. Customers shall perform routine verifications of protection systems on a scheduled basis in accordance with applicable reliability standards. The maximum verification interval is four years for most 115-kV elements, most transformer stations, and certain 230-kV elements and two years for all other high- voltage elements. All newly commissioned protection systems shall be verified within six months of the initial in-service date of the system. 1.3.1. Customers shall perform routine verifications of protection systems in accordance with applicable reliability standards. The Customer shall establish verification intervals for any protection systems not otherwise covered by the requirements of a reliability organization. The reverification period for those protections systems is to be entered in the agreement and initialed by the parties. A Customer shall re-verify after a change is made to an existing system.
1.3.2. Routine verification shall ensure with reasonable certainty that the protections respond correctly to fault conditions. 1.3.2. Intentionally left blank.
1.3.3. An electrically initiated simulated-fault clearing check is mandatory to verify new protections, after any wiring or component changes are made to a protection, and for routine verification of a protection. 1.3.3. Intentionally left blank.
1.3.6. Transmitters and Customers shall agree upon the final functional test procedures before the tests begin. If they cannot agree, the supply or continuity of supply shall depend on the performance of the tests that the Transmitter shall require. 1.3.6. The Transmitter and the Customer shall consult on the functional test procedures. The tests shall not begin until the procedure is accepted by the Transmitter. If they cannot agree, the supply or continuity of supply shall depend on the performance of the tests that the Transmitter shall require.
1.3.8. Customers shall make available to the Transmitter records of relay calibrations and protection verifications, so that records of the facility=s performance can be maintained. The specific records required shall be identified in this Agreement. 1.3.8. Customers shall make available to the Transmitter records of relay calibrations and protection verifications, so that records of the facility’=s performance can be maintained. The specific records required shall be identified in this Connection Agreement.

1.4.
Functional Tests and Periodic Verification

First version Current version
1.4.3. For (DC) circuitry checks, the logic of the auxiliary circuitry shall be thoroughly checked with the DC applied and the initiating devices suitably energized to initiate the process. When primary relays are the initiating device, the initiation shall be achieved by secondary injection of appropriate electrical quantities to the measuring elements. In certain cases where the sequence of operation is critical, monitoring by a portable sequence-of-events recorder may be required for proper analysis. Operation /tripping of any interrupting /isolating devices shall always be verified, as well as annunciation and target operation. 1.4.3. For direct current (DC) circuitry checks, a Transmitter shall thoroughly check the logic of the Transmitter’s auxiliary circuitry and the Customer shall thoroughly check the Customer’s auxiliary circuitry with the DC applied and the initiating devices suitably energized to initiate the process. Operation or tripping all any interrupting or isolating devices shall always be verified, as well as local and/or remote annunciation.

1.5. Failure Protection for High-Voltage Interrupting Devices (HVIs)

First version Current version
1.5.2. In general, the transmission system will require the HVI failure protection to be achieved by using remote or transfer trip circuits. 1.5.2. The HVI failure protection will initiate remote or transfer trip circuits and opening of the motor-operated disconnection switch unless otherwise prescribed by the Transmitter.
1.5.4. Automatic ground switches are not acceptable for any new installations for triggering line protection operation following the failure of a HVI. 1.5.4. Automatic ground switches are not acceptable for any new installations for triggering line protection operation.

1.6.
Instrument Transformers

First version Current version
1.6.2. Current transformers shall be connected so that adjacent relay protection zones overlap. 1.6.2. Current transformers should be connected so that adjacent relay protection zones overlap. Where they do not overlap, the Transmitter may approve alternative mitigation at its discretion.

1.7. Battery Banks and Direct Current Supply

First version Current version
1.7.2. Critical DC supplies annunciated such as relay protection circuits and high voltage interrupters (HVIs). 1.7.2. Critical DC supplies such as relay protection circuits and high voltage interrupters (HVIs) shall be monitored and alarmed.
1.7.3. For all generating facilities connected to the transmission system, two separately protected (fuse/breaker) and monitored DC station battery systems are required. 1.7.3. For all generating facilities connected to the transmission system, two separately protected (fuse/breaker) and monitored DC station battery systems are required unless the Transmitter and the IESO determine otherwise.
1.7.4. For tap transformer stations, one protected (fuse/breaker) monitored DC station battery system is required unless two systems are specified by the Transmitter. 1.7.4. For tapped transformer stations, one protected (fuse/breaker) monitored DC station battery system is required unless two systems are specified by the Transmitter.

Appendix 1

Version B–Form of Connection Agreement For Generator Customers

Schedule E

General Technical Requirements

First version Current version
Guidelines of Reliability Organizations 1.1 Intentionally left blank.
1.1.1. Customers and Transmitters shall follow all reliability organizations= standards as they may be amended from time to time.  
1.1.2. The Transmitter shall provide to Customers upon request, the address and contact persons at the relevant reliability organization.  

1.3. Protection and Control

1.3.1. The protection systems, which protects transmission system elements, shall be capable of minimizing the severity and extent of disturbances to the transmission system while themselves experiencing a first-order single contingency such as the failure of a relay protection system to operate or the failure of a breaker to trip. In particular:

First version Current version
1.3.1.1. the elements designated by the Transmitter as essential to system reliability and security shall be protected by two protection systems. Each system shall be independently capable of detecting and isolating all faults on those elements. These elements shall have breaker failure protection, but breaker failure protection need not be duplicated. Both protection systems shall initiate breaker failure protection; 1.3.1.1. the elements designated by the Transmitter or the IESO as essential to system reliability and security shall be protected by two protection systems. Each system shall be independently capable of detecting and isolating all faults on those elements. These elements shall have breaker failure protection, but breaker failure protection need not be duplicated. Both protection systems shall initiate breaker failure protection;
1.3.1.3. the use of two identical protection systems is not generally, recommended, because it increases the risk of simultaneous failure of both systems due to design deficiencies or equipment problems; 1.3.1.3. the use of two identical protection systems should be avoided because it increases the risk of simultaneous failure of both systems due to design deficiencies or equipment problems;
1.3.1.10. the two protection systems shall be supplied from separate secondary windings on one voltage transformer or potential device and from separate current transformers secondary windings, i.e., from two separate current transformers; 1.3.1.10. the two protection systems shall be supplied from separate secondary windings of a voltage and current transformer from separate voltage and current transformers;

1.8. Procedures for Maintenance and Periodic Verification

First version Current version
1.8.1. The Transmitter, using good utility practice, may specify the maintenance criteria and the maximum time intervals between verification cycles for those parts of Customers’= facilities that may materially adversely affect the transmission system. The obligations for maintenance and performance re-verification shall be stipulated in the appropriate schedule to this Agreement. 1.8.1. The Transmitter, using good utility practice, may specify the maintenance criteria and the maximum time intervals between verification cycles for those parts of Customers’= facilities that may materially adversely affect the transmission system. The obligations for maintenance and performance re-verification shall be stipulated in the appropriate schedule to this Connection Agreement.

Schedule F

Additional Technical Requirements

1.1 Supply Considerations

First version Current version
1.1.5 The method of grounding the neutral of all power transformer primary windings shall require the approval of the Transmitter. The Transmitter shall give its approval if it is satisfied that the reliability of its transmission system is not affected. 1.1.5 Transmitter approval is required before grounding the neutral of power transformer windings at tapped transmission system stations.

1.5 Autoreclosure and Manual Energization

First version Current version
1.5.2 Following a protection operation on a transmission line, the transmission breakers, located mainly in network switching and/or transformation stations, shall autoreclose after a certain time delay. Where the Generator is directly connected to the transmission line, or for configurations where the Generator could be damaged by autoreclosure of the line, the Generator shall provide a reliable means of disconnecting its equipment before autoreclosure. The Generator is responsible for protecting its own equipment and the Transmitter is not liable for damage to the Generator’=s equipment except as stipulated in section 15 of this Connection Agreement. The Generator may request a means of supervising the transmission autoreclosure prior to the disconnection of its equipment e.g. changes in protection logic at one or both stations to reduce the risk of such events. The criteria governing the use of reclosures are set out in the Ontario Hydro A”Policies, Principles & Guidelines” @ document AC-3.4.1(R1), Automatic Reclosure and Manual Energization on Bulk System Electricity Circuits@, which was in effect as of April 1, 1999. 1.5.2 Following a protection operation on a transmission line, the transmission breakers, located mainly in network switching and/or transformation stations, shall autoreclose after a certain time delay. Where the Generator is directly connected to the transmission line, or for configurations where the Generator could be damaged by autoreclosure of the line, the Generator shall provide a reliable means of disconnecting its equipment before autoreclosure. The Generator is responsible for protecting its own equipment and the Transmitter is not liable for damage to the Generator’=s equipment except as stipulated in section 15 of this Connection Agreement. The Generator may request a means of supervising the transmission autoreclosure prior to the disconnection of its equipment e.g. changes in protection logic at one or both stations to reduce the risk of such events. The criteria governing the use of reclosures are set out in the Ontario Hydro ”Policies, Principles & Guidelines” document A”C-3.4.1(R1), Automatic Reclosure and Manual Energization on Bulk System Electricity Circuits”@, which was in effect as of April 1, 1999.

Exhibit F.2

Typical Generator-owned Transmission Line Protection Requirement

Diagram identifying the typical generator-owned transmission line protection requirement.

Schedule G

Protection System Requirements

1.1 Telecommunications

First version Current version
1.1.2. Transmitters shall specify telecommunication channel media and protective systems. 1.1.2. The Transmitter shall specify to all Customers the telecommunication channel media and protective systems. These requirements apply to the facilities that interface between the Customer and the Transmitter.
1.1.4. Where each of the dual protections protecting the same system element requires communication channels, the equipment and channel for each protection shall be separated physically and designed to minimize the risk that both protections might be disabled simultaneously by a single contingency. 1.1.4. Intentionally left blank.
1.1.6. Major disturbances caused by telecommunication failures shall have annual frequency of less than 0.002 per year from the dependability aspect and less than 0.002 per year from the security aspect. 1.1.6. Major disturbances caused by telecommunication failures shall have annual frequency of less than 0.002 per year from the dependability aspect and less than 0.002 per year from the security aspect or as otherwise prescribed by the Transmitter.
1.1.7. Telecommunication protection for a single transmission system circuit shall have an unavailability less than forty two (42) minutes per year, and for two circuits it shall be less than four (4) minutes per year. 1.1.7. Telecommunication protection for a single transmission system circuit shall be unavailable for no more than forty two (42) minutes per year, and for two circuits no more than four (4) minutes per year or as otherwise prescribed by the Transmitter.
1.1.8. The telecommunication false-trip rate used as part of a protection system for a single transmission system circuit shall be not more than 0.1 false trips per year, and for two circuits it shall be not more than 0.001 false trips per year. 1.1.8. The telecommunication false-trip rate used as part of a protection system for a single transmission system circuit is no more than 0.1 false trips per year, and for two circuits is no more than 0.001 false trips per year unless otherwise prescribed by the Transmitter.

1.1.9. Total transmission system circuit trips coincident with telecommunications failure shall be not are not more than 0.001 per year unless otherwise prescribed by the Transmitter.

1.2. Test Schedule for Relaying Communication Channels

First version Current version
1.2.1. Communication channels associated with protective relaying shall be tested at periodic intervals to verify that the channels are operational and that their characteristics lie are within specific tolerances. The testing consists of signal adequacy tests and channel performance tests. 1.2.1. Communication channels associated with protective relaying shall be tested at periodic intervals in accordance with applicable reliability standards to verify that the channels are operational and that their characteristics lie are within specific tolerances. Testing should include signal adequacy tests and channel performance tests. The Transmitter shall establish testing intervals for any communication channels not otherwise subject to reliability standards.
1.2.1.1. Signal adequacy test intervals are:  
1.2.1.1.1. Channels–for Protection (unmonitored) at one (1)-month intervals; and  
1.2.1.1.2. Channels–for Protection (monitored) at twelve (12)-month intervals.  
1.2.1.2. Channel performance testing on leased communication circuits shall be conducted at 24-month intervals, while intervals for testing power line carrier equipment shall be equipment-specific.  

1.3. Verification and Maintenance Practices

First version Current version
1.3.1. Customers shall perform routine verifications of protection systems on a scheduled basis in accordance with applicable reliability standards. The maximum verification interval is four years for most 115-kV elements, most transformer stations, and certain 230-kV elements and two years for all other high- voltage elements. All newly commissioned protection systems shall be verified within six months of the initial in-service date of the system. 1.3.1. Customers shall perform routine verifications of protection systems on a scheduled basis in accordance with applicable reliability standards. The Customer shall establish verification intervals for any protection systems not otherwise covered by the requirements of a reliability organization. The reverification period for those protection systems is to be entered in the agreement and initialed by the parties. The Customer shall re-verify after a change is made to an existing protection system.
1.3.2. Routine verification shall ensure with reasonable certainty that the protections respond correctly to fault conditions. 1.3.2. Intentionally left blank.
1.3.3. An electrically initiated simulated-fault clearing check is mandatory to verify new protections, after any wiring or component changes are made to a protection, and for routine verification of a protection. 1.3.3. Intentionally left blank.
1.3.6. The Transmitters and Customers shall agree upon the final functional test procedures before the tests begin. If they cannot agree, the supply or continuity of supply shall depend on the performance of the tests that the Transmitter shall require. 1.3.6. The Transmitters and the Customers shall consult on the functional test procedures. The tests shall not begin until the procedure is accepted by the Transmitter. If they cannot agree, the supply or continuity of supply shall depend on the performance of the tests that the Transmitter shall require.

1.4. Functional Tests and Periodic Verification

First version Current version
1.4.1. Upon verification that the Customer’=s static tests on protection and control equipment, outlined in the Code and this Agreement have been satisfactorily completed, a series of tests shall be performed with the equipment in a dynamic mode. These tests shall ensure that the equipment performs correctly when it should and also that it will not operate improperly. 1.4.1. Upon verification that the Customer’=s static tests on protection and control equipment, outlined in the Code and this Connection Agreement have been satisfactorily completed, a series of tests shall be performed with the equipment in a dynamic mode. These tests shall ensure that the equipment performs correctly when it should and also that it will not operate improperly.
1.4.3. For (DC) circuitry checks, the logic of the auxiliary circuitry shall be thoroughly checked with the DC applied and the initiating devices suitably energized to initiate the process. When primary relays are the initiating device, the initiation shall be achieved by secondary injection of appropriate electrical quantities to the measuring elements. In certain cases where the sequence of operation is critical, monitoring by a portable sequence-of-events recorder may be required for proper analysis. Operation or /tripping of all interrupting /isolating devices shall always be verified, as well as annunciation and target operation. 1.4.3. For direct current (DC) circuitry checks, the Transmitter shall thoroughly check the logic of the Transmitter’s auxiliary circuitry and the Customer shall thoroughly check the Customer’s auxiliary circuitry with the DC applied and the initiating devices suitably energized to initiate the process. Operation or /tripping of any interrupting or isolating devices shall always be verified, as well as local and/or remote annunciation.

1.5. Failure Protection for High-Voltage Interrupting Devices (HVIs)

First version Current version
1.5.2. In general, the transmission system will require the HVI failure protection to be achieved by using remote or transfer trip circuits. 1.5.2. The HVI failure protection will initiate remote or transfer trip circuits and opening of the motor-operated disconnection switch unless otherwise prescribed by the Transmitter.
1.5.4. Automatic ground switches are not acceptable for any new installations for triggering line protection operation following the failure of a HVI. 1.5.4. Automatic ground switches are not acceptable for any new installations for triggering line protection operation.

1.6. Instrument Transformers

First version Current version
1.6.2. Current transformers shall be connected so that adjacent relay protection zones overlap. 1.6.2. Current transformers should be connected so that adjacent relay protection zones overlap. Where they do not overlap, the Transmitter may approve alternative mitigation at its discretion.

1.7.
Battery Banks and Direct Current Supply

First version Current version
1.7.2. Critical DC supplies shall be monitored and. annunciated such as relay protection circuits and high voltage interrupters (HVIs). 1.7.2. Critical DC supplies such as relay protection circuits and high voltage interrupters (HVIs) shall be monitored and alarmed.
1.7.3. For all generating facilities connected to the transmission system, two separately protected (fuse/breaker) and monitored DC station battery systems are required. 1.7.3. For all generating facilities connected to the transmission system, two separately protected (fuse/breaker) and monitored DC station battery systems are required unless the Transmitter and the IESO determine otherwise.
1.7.4. For tapp transformer stations, one protected (fuse/breaker) monitored DC station battery system is required unless two systems are specified by the Transmitter. 1.7.4. For tapped transformer stations, one protected (fuse/breaker) monitored DC station battery system is required unless two systems are specified by the Transmitter.

(151-G160)