4.1 Initial notification

4.1.1 According to responsibilities outlined in federal legislation, (see PNERP, Master Plan Paragraph 5.2.1) regulations and agreement with the provincial government, the Darlington Nuclear Generating Station (DNGS) operator shall notify the pre-designated contact points (see Paragraph 4.1.12 below) in provincial and municipal emergency organizations as soon as conditions arise at the facility which require such initial notification under the criteria described in Table 4.1 and, as incorporated in facility procedures.

4.1.2 The form and content of the initial notification shall be determined by the Commissioner of Emergency Management.

4.1.3 The DNGS operator shall make a notification to the designated provincial and municipal contact points within 15 minutes of categorizing the event.

4.1.4 The initial notification message from the DNGS operator shall include:

  1. the notification category
  2. recommended default protective measures

4.1.5 Where more than one criteria are applicable, the highest category triggered shall be reported in the notification. The notification message shall not be delayed to permit an accurate assessment of the applicable category.

4.1.6 In the case of a General Emergency or On-Site Emergency notification, the message must state whether an emission is ongoing or if not, give a best estimate of when it is expected to commence and the wind direction at the time of the notification.

4.1.7 During the initial stage (see Paragraph 4.1.8 below) of an emergency, the General Emergency notification category (received by the PEOC Duty Officer) initiates the implementation of off-site default protective measures.

4.1.8 The initial stage of an emergency is defined as the earlier of:

  1. The first 4 hours after the initial notification, or
  2. Once ongoing reporting by the DNGS CEOF to the PEOC Scientific Section is established.

4.1.9 If during the initial stages of an emergency, the assessment of the on-site situation changes to warrant a different category (and to recommended protective measures) than those initially notified, then the DNGS operator shall immediately issue such changes to the designated provincial and municipal contact points.

4.1.10 Once ongoing reporting is established between the DNGS CEOF and the PEOC Scientific Section, any changes to the notification category or recommended protective measures shall be included in the regular data transmittals sent by the DNGS CEOF to the PEOC Scientific Section and shall no longer be transmitted to the provincial and municipal contact points.

4.1.11 The DNGS operator cannot terminate or cancel a notification once it has been made. Such a notification shall automatically lapse when the provincial response to it is formally terminated (see Paragraph 4.2.3 below).

4.1.12 Contact points

  1. Contact points and phone numbers shall be pre-determined and routinely validated to ensure availability.
  2. The provincial contact point shall be the PEOC Duty Officer.
  3. The following municipal contact points shall be set out in the municipal plans:
    1. A contact point to receive an initial notification anytime, 24 hours per day, 7 days per week.
    2. A municipal emergency response staff person who can be contacted anytime 24 hours per day, 7 days per week for passage of information and monitoring of the situation following the initiation of a notification.

4.2 Initial provincial and municipal response

4.2.1 The initial provincial response to a notification from DNGS shall depend on the category (and other relevant information) contained in the notification message (see Table 4.1).

4.2.2 Within 15 minutes of the receipt of an initial notification, the PEOC Commander shall decide on the initial response level to be adopted and inform the municipal contact point(s). This level should normally be the one linked to the category of the notification received (see Table 4.2) unless another level is judged to be more appropriate.

4.2.3 The PEOC Commander or PEOC Operations Chief may adopt another provincial response level as appropriate including termination of the provincial response. All stakeholders shall be notified of any such change.

4.2.4 The initial (and any subsequent) response level to be adopted by the Municipalities and other organizations shall be communicated by the PEOC Commander (see Paragraph 4.2.2 above) to all stakeholders. The general municipal response for each level is outlined in Table 4.2; the specific response shall be described in the municipal plans.

4.3 Internal notifications

4.3.1 Each organization or agency required to respond to a nuclear emergency shall have an internal notification system to inform all concerned staff of the imminence or occurrence of an emergency under this plan, and of the appropriate response to the notification.

4.3.2 Each jurisdiction and organization receiving a notification of an activation response (either partial or full) shall issue an appropriate internal notification to its units and individuals who are required to respond. The notification shall indicate the level of activation to be adopted.

4.3.3 The PEOC and each jurisdiction and organization required to respond and issue an internal or external notification (see Section 4.4 below) shall prepare a notification procedure and list of recipients.

4.3.4 PEOC Notifications

  1. If the PEOC is to be activated (whether fully or partially), then the PEOC Commander shall issue an appropriate notification (including an indication of the level of activation) to at least one pre-designated contact point in each of the following jurisdictions and organizations:
    1. Regional Municipality of Durham
    2. each provincial-level organization required to respond to the emergency
    3. Host Municipalities
    4. Darlington Nuclear Generating Station
    5. DNGS Operator (CEOF)
  2. Additionally, the PEOC Commander shall notify:
    1. PEOC staff
    2. Emergency Information Section staff

4.4 External notifications

4.4.1 Additional organizations or agencies which might be affected by a nuclear emergency under this plan, or which may be required to assist in responding to it, should be notified at an appropriate stage by their links in the Emergency Response Organization. As such, upon adoption of an activation response (partial or full), external notifications shall be carried out as detailed below. The notification must indicate the level of activation being adopted.

4.4.2 The PEOC Commander shall ensure the following are notified:

  1. the federal Government Operations Centre (GOC) and the Federal Nuclear Emergency Plan (FNEP) Duty Officer who shall then complete the notifications listed in Paragraph 4.4.3 below
  2. the Province of Quebec (Sûreté du Quebec)
  3. the State of New York Emergency Management Agency
  4. the State of Ohio Emergency Management Agency
  5. the State of Michigan Emergency Management Agency
  6. Canada News Wire/National Alert Aggregation and Dissemination System (NAADS)
  7. GO Transit
  8. Bell Canada
  9. wireless phone providers

4.4.3 As directed by the FNEP Duty Officer, the federal Government Operations Centre (GOC) shall notify:

  1. Natural Resources Canada (NRCan)
  2. Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)
  3. Privy Council Office (PCO)
  4. Transport Canada
  5. Department of National Defence (DND)
  6. Canadian Coast Guard (which shall notify the US Coast Guard under agreed protocols)
  7. CNSC Duty Officer
  8. Global Affairs Canada
  9. Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA)
  10. Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA)
  11. Indigenous Services Canada (ISC)
  12. Air Traffic Control
  13. CN Rail
  14. CP Rail
  15. VIA Rail
  16. USA Department of Homeland Security
  17. international organizations under existing agreements, conventions and departmental emergency plans

4.4.4 Other agencies and organizations shall be notified by the following:

  1. Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs shall notify the Dairy Farmers of Ontario.
  2. Ministry of Children, Community and Social Services shall notify the Red Cross, Ontario Zone.
  3. Ministry of Natural Resources and Forestry shall notify:
    1. Central Lake Ontario Conservation Authority
    2. Toronto and Region Conservation Authority
  4. Municipal plans shall include provisions for the following external notifications:
    1. school boards
    2. paramedic services
    3. local utilities (e.g., hydro, gas, water)
    4. local branches of voluntary organizations

4.5 Provincial response levels

4.5.1 The provincial response level adopted depends on the notification category received from DNGS (see Table 4.2).

4.5.2 Reportable event and abnormal incident

  1. In the event of a Reportable Event notification from DNGS the provincial response level adopted should be Routine Monitoring, unless the PEOC Commander decides otherwise.
  2. In the event of an Abnormal Incident notification from DNGS, the provincial response level adopted should be Enhanced Monitoring, unless the PEOC Commander decides otherwise.
  3. In these cases, the notifications and level of staffing shall proceed according to Table 4.2, unless the PEOC Commander decides otherwise.
  4. The PEOC Commander shall ensure the applicable stakeholders are notified when a response to a Reportable Event or Abnormal Incident has been terminated.

4.5.3 On-site Emergency

An On-site Emergency can result in either a partial or full activation provincial response (see Figure 4.1) depending on the source of the accident and the prospects for the resulting emission:

  1. An On-site Emergency with no emission occurring shall normally result in a partial activation response.
  2. An On-site Emergency with a (non-reactor) emission occurring or expected within 12 hours shall normally result in a full activation response.

4.5.4 General emergency

A General Emergency notification from DNGS shall result in a full activation response (see Figure 4.2) as it denotes an emission from a reactor can result due to fuel and containment failures.

4.5.5 The remainder of this chapter therefore deals with the operational response to an accident at DNGS which results in, or has the potential to result in, an emission of radioactive material to the atmosphere, and therefore requires a partial or full activation response.

4.5.6 The partial and full activationresponse to a nuclear emergency is described below in relation to the three (3) successive phases defined by the PNERP Master Plan, Section 5.9.

Figure 4.1: Initial Provincial Response to an On-Site Emergency Notification

Note: Some actions may be implemented simultaneously, although they are shown here sequentially.

  • On-site Emergency Notification
    • Notification Category Detail:
      Ongoing or Imminent (non-reactor) Emission
      • Provincial Response Level:
        Full Activation
      • Initiate Public Alerting and Issue Emergency Bulletin to Shelter AAZ and Evacuate Lake Sector D14
      • Consider Declaration of a Provincial Emergency
      • PEOC Considers Other Precautionary and Protective Measures
      • Issue Emergency Bulletin for Other Protective Measures and Ingestion Control Measures (as appropriate)
    • Notification Category Detail:
      Delayed Emission (more than 12 hours)
      • Provincial Response Level:
        Partial Activation
      • Consider Venting Options
      • Full Activation
      • Consideration of a Provincial Emergency Declaration
      • PEOC considers Precautionary and Protective Measures (as appropriate)
      • Initate Public Alerting and Issue Emergency Bulletin for Precautionary and Protective Measures and Ingesion Control Measures (as appropriate)

Download printer-friendly version of Figure 4.1 (PNG, 61 KB).

Figure 4.2: Initial Provincial Response to a General Emergency Notification

Note: Some actions may be implemented simultaneously, although they are shown here sequentially.

  • General Emergency Notification
    • Ongoing or Imminent (reactor) Emission (12 hours or less)
      • Provincial Response Level:
        Full Activation
      • Initiate Public Alerting and Issue Emergency Bulletin to Evacuate AAZ including all Lake Sectors and Shelter remainder of DPZ
      • PEOC Considers Other Precautionary and Protective Measures
      • Issue Emergency Bulletin for Other Protective Measures and Ingestion Control Measures (as appropriate)

Download printer-friendly version of Figure 4.2 (PNG, 37 KB).

4.6 Early phase response

4.6.1 The early phase:

  1. Begins with an initial notification of an emergency prior to, or during a radioactiverelease.
  2. Lasts anywhere from hours to days and in the event of, an ongoing or imminent emission,should involve the implementation of automatic default protective measures (see Table 4.3).
  3. Ends when the radioactive release is brought under control and reliable environmental radiation monitoring is available to be used for protective action decision-making.
  4. Shall be terminated and the intermediate phase shall begin based on the criteria in Section 4.7 below.

4.6.2 The operational response in this phase differs depending on whether the initial provincial response level is partial or full activation.

4.6.3 Partial activation

  1. A PEOC partialactivation response (see Figure 4.1) is adopted when it is expected that a radioactive release will occur at some point in the future and therefore protective or operational measures (other than monitoring and assessment of the situation) are not likely to be required within 36 hours.
  2. When the PEOC is partially activated, initial actions include:
    1. Notification of the emergency management organization and set up and full staffing of the PEOC and the Municipal EOCs to monitor and assess the situation on a continuous basis.
    2. Activation of the Ministry EOCs and Unified Transportation Coordination Centre and staffing as appropriate to the situation.
    3. Activation of the Emergency Information Centres (EICs) with staffing at an appropriate level. Provincial staff to be dispatched, as appropriate.
    4. All emergency response personnel not immediately required should be placed on standby. This provision should ensure that personnel can be quickly contacted when needed to report to their duty stations.
    5. Other emergency centres should be readied to a level where they can become fully operational without undue delay, when required. Specific levels of readiness shall be described in the municipal plans.
    6. Consideration shall be given to issuing an emergency bulletin(s) and news release(s).
  3. Technical assessments of the accident situation and projected radiation doses shall be carried out on a regular basis by the PEOC Scientific Section, as described in Section 4.6.5 below.
  4. The technical assessments carried out by the PEOC Scientific Section, as well as inputs from the other PEOC sections shall be compiled by the PEOC Planning Section Chief into recommendations for protective action decision-making, to the PEOC Commander.
  5. The PEOC Commander, in consultation with the PEOC Command Section and select stakeholder organizations (including MOHLTC, Designated Municipalities and others deemed appropriate), shall consider and decide on the need for operational measures as well as future protective actions and ensure that all stakeholders are so informed.
  6. If the emergency situation is resolved and the potential for off-site consequences is eliminated, the PEOC Commander shall downgrade the provincial response level, as appropriate.
  7. Alternatively, the PEOC Commander shall upgrade the response level to full activation when a radioactive emission seems likely to occur in 36 hours or less or, as deemed appropriate.

4.6.4 Full activation

  1. A PEOC full activation response should be adopted as a result of:
    1. An initial notification from DNGS stating that an emission is ongoing or imminent (On-site or General Emergency), or
    2. An escalation of an existing emergency situation, where an emission is now expected in 36 hours or less
  2. The following actions shall be initiated upon adoption of a full activation response:
    1. All emergency operations centres, Emergency Information Centres, Reception Centres, Evacuation Centres, Emergency Worker Centres and Monitoring and Decontamination Units are fully staffed and operational.
    2. All emergency response personnel from Paragraph i. above immediately report to their places of duty.
    3. Public alerting is initiated and emergency bulletins issued concurrently (see Sections 6.2 and 6.4).
    4. Operational directives (or emergency orders) issued for protective actions per Paragraph c) or d) below, as appropriate.
    5. PEOC Commander advises government of the need for a provincial emergency declaration (see PNERP Master Plan Section 1.5.1).
    6. Provincial Chief Emergency Information Officer (PCEIO) shall consider establishing a Joint Information Centre as necessary (Paragraph 6.5.2 e)).
  3. Where the full activation response level is adopted as a result of an initial notification from DNGS that an emission is ongoing or imminent (see Paragraph a) i. above), the default actions noted in Table 4.3shall be implemented, unless there are good reasons for modifying the response. This default response is undertaken due to the potential lack of detailed information or plant data together with a lack of available time for analysis.
  4. Where an escalating event results in the upgrade to a full activation response (see Paragraph a) ii. above), data gathering and analysis are already being undertaken by the emergency response organization, with a protective action decision-making process in place. Therefore, in this escalating type of scenario, the technical and operational assessments and the recommendation process (see Section 4.6.5 below) replaces the need for default actions.

4.6.5 PEOC Scientific Section technical assessments

In the early phase, prior to or during a radioactive emission, the PEOC Scientific Section shall undertake technical assessments in accordance with PEOC Scientific Section procedures which shall serve as input into the PEOC Planning Section recommendations for Command decision-making. Examples of technical assessments include:

  1. Accident assessments

    The Nuclear Incident Group (NIG) of the PEOC Scientific Section shall receive hourly plant status and data from the DNGS EOC, through agreed to transmission systems (and backup), and shall on an ongoing basis:

    1. Evaluate the status of relevant station systems and make ongoing assessments of possible accident progressions, considering both positive and negative outcomes (see Paragraph a) ii. below).
    2. Monitor the progress of station vacuum structure repressurization and continually forecast the date and time when its pressure could reach, firstly, the minimum level required for the Filtered Air Discharge System (FADS) operation and, secondly, the level at which FADS operation becomes necessary.
    3. Analyze venting data and make projections to inform venting decision-making by the PEOC Commander and stakeholders (see Section 4.6.6 below).
    4. Liaise with CEOF staff and undertake a technical projection of the maximum distance from the reactor facility at which the generic criteria (see PNERP Master Plan, Annex E, Appendix 1) for protective measures against the plume are likely to be reached during the anticipated duration of the emission (allowance should be made for the effects of early venting, if applicable):
      • evacuation
      • sheltering-in-place
      • iodine thyroid blocking
  2. Condition of station systems
    1. Table 4.3 describes four main categories for the condition of station systems along with some examples of each. It can provide a baseline for making appropriate judgements or, if time and adequate information are not available, it may be used to determine default measures.
    2. In an actual event, the estimate of station conditions may not conform exactly to the various sets of conditions given in Table 4.3. In such a case, the default protective measures listed in the table, may be appropriately modified.
    3. The PEOC Scientific Section Chief shall determine and make recommendations to the PEOC Commander for approval on:
      • the set of protective measures that best match the current conditions
      • whether current meteorological conditions warrant any change to the distance out to which protective measures are advised
      • the DPZ and CPZ response sectors likely to be affected by the emission
  3. Exposure levels

    The PEOC Scientific Section shall make an assessment as to whether the dose in any sector(s) is likely to require the activation of the Radiation Health Response Plan (see Paragraph 6.9.7).

  4. Subsequent technical assessments

    As more data and projections become available, the PEOC Scientific Section shall continuously update the assessments made in order to establish whether any additional protective measures are required.

4.6.6 Venting of containment

  1. During a Design Basis Accident (DBA), the holdup period of any radioactive material within the station containment structure (e.g., vacuum building) permits the venting of said contained radioactivity in a controlled manner and in a safe direction, i.e., over the lake (refer to PNERP Master Plan, Annex G).
  2. During a Beyond Design Basis Accident (BDBA), the holdup period of any radioactive material may be significantly reduced and radioactive material may be released in an uncontrolled manner. BDBAs are categorized as General Emergencies and as such the PEOC assumes full activation as described in Section 4.6.4 above.
  3. For all accidents, the PEOC Commander may decide at any time to upgrade to full activation as conditions warrant however the Commander should upgrade no later than 36 hours prior to venting.
  4. For all accidents, the DNGS operator shall include, in each hourly report to the PEOC, an estimate of the time at which the vacuum building pressure would reach the minimum level at which a venting system can be operated.
  5. The time interval between the occurrence of the accident and containment pressure reaching this minimum level may depend on the condition and behaviour of the containment system. With no impairment to containment, this time interval is expected to be about 7 days (an impaired containment could significantly reduce that time).
  6. For all accidents, the DNGS operator shall consult with the Province, Designated Municipalities and CNSC before undertaking any venting activity, unless venting must be performed in an urgent manner to protect the structural integrity of containment (see Paragraph 2.6.4 b)). In such a case, every effort shall be made to inform these stakeholders as early as possible.
  7. The PEOC Commander should consider, in consultation with the DNGS operator, the CNSC, City of Toronto and Regional Municipality of Durham, whether venting over Lake Ontario (according to the considerations in the PNERP Master Plan, Annex G), would be feasible and advisable. Detailed procedures for such decision-making should be developed in consultation with the above agencies and incorporated in the PEOC procedures for the PEOC Scientific, Operations and Command Sections, as appropriate.
  8. Environmental Radiation Monitoring

    If venting over Lake Ontario, ground monitoring teams from DNGS shall complete radiological surveys following the shoreline, out to 20 km on either side of the plant to detect any “blow back” of radioactivity towards land during venting. Any radioactivity detected shall be immediately reported by the DNGS operator to the PEOC.

4.6.7 Early phase protective action decision-making

  1. The PEOC Scientific Section's technical assessment of the situation should produce a projection of the maximum distance from DNGS at which the generic criteria for evacuation, sheltering-in-place and KI ingestion are likely to be reached during the anticipated duration of the emission.
  2. The PEOC Planning Section shall undertake an evaluation of this technical assessment, taking into account operational and public policy considerations, and shall prepare a preliminary assessment regarding the need to implement these measures, proposed timings, and the area within which these measures should be taken.
  3. These assessments shall be continually updated and, as soon as a reasonably certain picture of the evacuation (and other protective measures) distance is achieved, the PEOC, through the Command Section, shall consult with applicable stakeholders (Designated Municipalities, host and support Municipalities, federal departments, the reactor facility).
  4. Command decisions on protective action shall be communicated to the emergency response organization (see PEOC Command Section procedures) and the applicable emergency bulletin(s) shall be issued (per PEOC Operations Section procedures).

4.7 Intermediate phase response

4.7.1 The intermediate phase begins once the radioactive release has been brought under control and reliable environmental radiation monitoring is available for use in protective action decision-making.

4.7.2 Following the radioactive emission, the PEOC Scientific Section's input into the protective action decision-making process shall no longer be based on modelling the projected doses or on default measures but rather on the tangible results of environmental radiation monitoring.

4.7.3 The PEOC Scientific Section shall undertake, and continuously update, the following assessments:

  1. Off-site environmental radiation monitoring undertaken by the ERAMG shall produce a picture of the contamination situation.
  2. The PEOC Scientific Section Chief shall make technical recommendations for protective action (exposure and ingestion control measures) based on the results of the actual contamination levels as compared against the Operational Intervention Levels (OILs) (per the PNERP Master Plan, Annex E, Appendix 2).
  3. The PEOC Scientific Section Chief shall make recommendations regarding sector safety status on behalf of emergency workers operating in the area.
  4. The intermediate phase operations of the PEOC Scientific Section shall be detailed in the Scientific Section procedures.

4.7.4 Intermediate phase protective action decision-making

  1. The PEOC Planning Section shall undertake an assessment of these Scientific Section technical recommendations, in light of operational and public policy considerations, and shall prepare recommendations for the PEOC Commander regarding the protective measures, areas where they should be implemented, and implementation timings.
  2. These assessments shall be continually updated and, as soon as a reasonably certain picture of the evacuation (and other protective measures) distance is achieved, the PEOC Commander shall advise all stakeholders of the protective action strategy to be undertaken. If time is available, the PEOC Commander shall undertake prior consultation with applicable stakeholders on the protective action strategy recommendations.
  3. Planning for the management of radioactive waste (see Section 6.11) generated by the emergency should preferably begin during the intermediate phase.

4.8 Transition to the recovery phase

4.8.1 During the recovery phase actions will commence to restore the affected area to pre-emergency conditions and to scale back the emergency response organization.

4.8.2 As there may not be a clear distinction between phases, with emergency response operations occurring in all three, planning for recovery should begin as soon as practical.

4.8.3 Stakeholder recovery plans should include measures to address the following as applicable to their organization:

  1. recovery organization structure
  2. care for persons exposed or contaminated
  3. long-term relocation
  4. resettlement and return of evacuees
  5. long-term support for those living in contaminated areas
  6. decontamination and reconstruction of property damaged during the emergency
  7. economic impact issues and improvement plans

4.8.4 Stakeholder recovery plans should be prepared in advance and conform to the provincial recovery plan.

Table 4.1: Initial notification categories and criteria

Category Criteria (alternative) Examples
Reportable event
  1. Any event or condition that reduces the reactor facility's capability to mitigate an emergency on-site, and which persists for longer than the allowable time limits.
  2. Any event or condition that reduces the reactor facility's capability to provide the agreed off-site emergency support, and which is expected to persist for over 8 hours, or actually does so.
  3. Natural, toxic, flammable, destructive or other phenomena which have the potential to lead to a minor* break in the physical integrity of the nuclear heat transport system boundary or the moderator system.
  4. Unexpected or unplanned activation of the emergency cooling injection system or the containment system (including box-up). 
  5. Declaration of a Station Emergency, with no potential for off-site effects.
  6. Any credible publicly announced threat to, or attempted or actual breach of, the facility's security that threatens its safe operation.

1A. Level 1 or 2 impairment of a special safety system, which persists for more than 4 hours.

1B. Entry into emergency operating procedures.

2. Reduced ability to:

  1. Carry out off-site field monitoring.
  2. Provide source term data.
  3. Provide required off-site ERO staff.

3A. Equipment failure.

3B. Extreme environmental conditions.

3C. Earthquake.

3D. Fire or explosion.

4A. Unexpected or unplanned activation of the ECI system component that does not result in injection.

4B. Unexpected or unplanned activation of the containment system.

4C. Excludes events initiated during testing.

5. As per nuclear emergency procedures.

6A. A publicized bomb threat.

6B. A breach or attempted breach of the protected area.
Abnormal incident
  1. A minor* break in the physical integrity of the nuclear heat transport system boundary with no fuel failures (actual or likely).
  2. Natural, toxic, flammable, destructive or other phenomena which have the potential to lead to the major* break specified in Item 1 under On-Site Emergency.
  3. Activation of the emergency cooling injection system or the containment system (including box-up) due to a process system upset which is not reportable under any other category.
  4. Declaration of a Station Emergency due to an occurrence which has the potential to result in off-site effects.

1.   LOCA on one or more units, without fuel failures and with or without containment impairment.

2.   Similar causes as for # 3 under Reportable Event

3A. Activation of the ECI system component that results in injection.

3B. Activation of the containment system on high activity or pressure.

On-site emergency

(Note: A notification with this category must state whether an emission is ongoing or, if not, give a best estimate of when it is expected to commence).
  1. A major* break in the physical integrity of the nuclear heat transport system boundary, the moderator system, or the irradiated (or spent) fuel handling and storage system, with fuel failures* but with a fully intact and functioning containment system.
  2. An abnormal emission* of radioactive material to the atmosphere from any non-reactor source.
  3. An event or condition which has the potential to lead to a General Emergency criterion, concurrent with the loss of the ability to detect or control such a development.
  4. Hostile action in the protected area resulting in actual or potential loss of control over station safety or safety related systems but excluding reactor control systems.

1A. LOCA with fuel failures on one or more units.

1B. Fuelling machine accident.

2A. Spent fuel bay accident.

2B. Darlington TRF Accident

3A. Loss of all AC power.

3B. Extreme environmental conditions.

3C. Earthquake damage.

3D. Fire or explosion.

3E. Entry requirements met for SAMG or EME to maintain fuel cooling.

General emergency

(Note: A notification with this category must state whether an emission is ongoing or, if not, give a best estimate of when it is expected to commence).
  1. Damage to reactor fuel leading to the release of radioactivity from the fuel coincident with the failure, impairment, or bypass of containment, resulting in an atmospheric emission or, a reasonable expectation of an emission within the next 12 hours.
  2. Hostile action in the protected area resulting in actual or imminent loss of the ability to achieve and maintain the reactor in a cold shutdown state.
  1. LOCA with actual or imminent fuel failures on one or more units and impaired containment.
  2. Inability to control or maintain reactivity control or fuel cooling.

* To be defined in reactor facility procedures.

Table 4.2: Initial provincial and municipal response

Initial notification Initial provincial response Initial municipal response
Reportable event

Routine monitoring

  1. Provincial Emergency Operations Centre (PEOC) shall notify the municipal contact point(s), reactor facility operator, and others as appropriate, and shall monitor the situation.
  2. PEOC Scientific staff is consulted, if appropriate.
  3. If and when appropriate, Emergency Information Section (EIS) staff issues news release(s).

Emergency response staff remain in contact with the PEOC, and monitor event.

Abnormal incident

Enhanced monitoring

  1. PEOC should adopt Enhanced Monitoring and shall inform the municipal contact point(s), reactor facility operator, and any other organizations affected.
  2. External notifications to Michigan, New York, Ohio and Quebec are made.
  3. PEOC to set up a duty team consisting of operations staff, scientific staff, reactor facility operator representative(s), EIS staff, and others as required.
  4. If and when appropriate, EIS staff shall issue news release(s).
  5. Provincial staff are notified to remain available to report in for duty.

Emergency response staff monitor event, preferably from Municipal Emergency Operations Centres (EOCs).

On-site emergency

(No emission occurring)

Partial activation

  1. PEOC should adopt partial activation response (for details, see Section 4.6.3), and shall initiate the appropriate internal and external notifications (Section 4.3 and Section 4.4 respectively), including the municipal contact points and the host communities.
  2. If a reactor emission is expected to occur in 36 hours or less, PEOC should consider adopting full activation response and consider the need to implement the immediate measures per General Emergency below.
  3. PEOC shall be fully staffed. Consideration shall be given to issuing an emergency bulletin (Section 6.4), news release or both.
  4. Ministry EOCs and Unified Transportation Coordination Centre (UTCC) to be established and appropriately staffed.
  1. Issue notification placing municipal Emergency Response Organization on standby.
  2. Municipal EOCs fully staffed.
  3. Emergency Information Centres (EICs) to be established.
  4. Other emergency centres readied to become operational without undue delay.

On-site emergency

(Emission Ongoing or expected within 12 hours)

Full activation

  1. PEOC should notify and require the municipal contacts to activate the public alerting system (Section 6.2).
  2. PEOC should adopt full activation (Section 4.6.4), and shall initiate the appropriate internal and external notifications (Section 4.3 and Section 4.4 respectively), including the host community.
  3. PEOC shall issue the appropriate emergency bulletin (Section 6.4).
  4. PEOC shall issue operational directives implementing the following operational measures, unless there are good reasons for modifying this response, for:
    1. Sheltering (Section 5.3.4) in the Automatic Action Zone.
    2. Suspension of road and rail traffic through the Automatic Action Zone.
    3. Clearance of all boaters in Lake Sector D14.
  5. PEOC shall assess the situation for further action.
  6. PEOC shall issue further emergency bulletins, as appropriate (Section 6.4).
  7. EIS staff shall issue news releases, as appropriate.
  8. UTCC and Ministry EOCs shall be established.
  1. Initiate public alerting.
  2. Issue notification activating municipal Emergency Response Organization.
  3. Municipal EOCs, EICs and other centres to be activated and operational.
  4. Implement operational directives, as issued by the PEOC.

General emergency

(Emission ongoing or expected within 12 hours)

Full activation

  1. PEOC shall notify and ensure that the municipal contacts have activated the public alerting system (Section 6.2).
  2. PEOC shall issue the appropriate emergency bulletin (Section 6.4).
  3. PEOC shall issue operational directives implementing the following operational measures for:
    1. Suspension of road, rail and air traffic throughout the Automatic Action Zone.
    2. Evacuation of the Automatic Action Zone and Lake Sectors D14 through D16 unless there are good reasons for modifying this response.
    3. Precautionary measures in the DPZ.
  4. If emission is ongoing or, if evacuations will not be completed prior to emission, issue operational directives implementing the operational measures for:
    1. Evacuees to report for radiation monitoring or, if not possible, to evacuate to a destination beyond the DPZ and to undertake self-decontamination.
    2. Ingestion of KI pills (Section 5.3.3 ) in the Automatic Action Zone.
    3. Sheltering (Section 5.3.4) in the rest of the Detailed Planning Zone. Otherwise, take this action 4 hours (or, at a time deemed appropriate) before the expected time of commencement of the emission.
  5. PEOC shall adopt full activation (Section 4.6.4), and shall initiate the appropriate internal and external notifications (Section 4.3 and Section 4.4 respectively), including the host community.
  6. PEOC shall assess the situation for further action.
  7. PEOC shall issue further emergency bulletins, as appropriate (Section 6.4).
  8. EIS staff shall issue news releases, as appropriate.
  9. Ministry EOCs and UTCC to be established.
  1. Initiate public alerting.
  2. Issue notification activating municipal Emergency Response Organization.
  3. Municipal EOCs, EICs and other centres activated and fully staffed.
  4. Implement operational directives, as issued by the PEOC.

Table 4.3: Default protective measures

Table showing examples of station system impairment conditions and the corresponding default protective measures that should be issued as operational directives.
Condition of station systems Examples Default protective measures
Issue immediate operational directives

A. Intermediate to severe core damage with an accompanying loss of the containment function.

Either:

  1. Failure of reactor shutdown, or
  2. LOCA and failure of ECI, or
  3. LOCA causing early flow stagnation in a core pass.

Combined with either:

  1. Large hole in the containment envelope (e.g., airlock doors open, multiple airlock seal failures), or
  2. An emission pathway bypassing containment.
  1. Evacuation of the Automatic Action Zone, all other Detailed Planning Zone sectors likely to be affected by the emission, and the area beyond the Detailed Planning Zone likely to be affected by the emission up to a distance of 20 km from the reactor.
  2. Iodine Thyroid Blocking: All evacuees from the Detailed Planning Zone to ingest a KI dose.
  3. Personal Monitoring: All evacuees from the Detailed Planning Zone to proceed to a facility for personal monitoring or to self-decontaminate at destination.
  4. Sheltering: All sectors likely to be affected by the emission, which are not immediately evacuating, to shelter. Also, all sectors and areas adjacent (in the same ring) to sectors and areas being evacuated should shelter-in-place.

B. Intermediate level of core damage and a loss of the filtered pathway.

Either:

  1. LOCA and failure of ECI, or
  2. LOCA and failure of emergency coolant recovery.

Combined with either:

  1. Containment envelope impairment resulting in loss of pressure control, or
  2. Impairment of the FADS, including a reduction in filter efficiency.
  1. Evacuation of the Automatic Action Zone and all other Detailed Planning Zone sectors likely to be affected by the emission.
  2. Iodine Thyroid Blocking: All evacuees to ingest a KI dose.
  3. Personal Monitoring: All evacuees to proceed to a facility for personal monitoring (ongoing emission only) or to self-decontaminate at destination.
  4. Sheltering: All sectors likely to be affected by the emission, which are not immediately evacuating, to shelter. Also, all sectors adjacent (in the same ring) to those being evacuated should shelter-in-place.

C. Intermediate to severe fuel damage with containment envelope impairment leading to early venting.

Either:

  1. LOCA causing flow stagnation in a core pass, or
  2. LOCA and failure of ECI, or
  3. LOCA and failure of emergency coolant recovery, or
  4. End-fitting or other failure and fuel ejection from a channel, or
  5. LOCA in fuelling machine.

Combined with:

A loss of containment pressure control requiring early venting.
  1. Evacuation of the Automatic Action Zone and all sectors in the Inner Ring likely to be affected by the emission.
  2. Personal Monitoring: All evacuees to proceed to a facility for personal monitoring (ongoing emission only) or to self-decontaminate at destination.
  3. Sheltering: All sectors in the Inner Ring adjacent to those being evacuated should shelter-in-place. Sectors beyond this zone likely to be affected by the emission to also shelter-in-place.

D. All other events or conditions likely to lead to an emission.
  1. Spent fuel bay accident.
  2. TRF accident
  1. Sheltering the Automatic Action Zone and evacuate Lake Sector D14.